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What's Fair is Fair: Tribal Assertions
of Jurisdiction over Arbitration
Decisions
First Specialty Insurance Corp. v. Confederated Tribes of the
Grand Ronde Community of Oregon.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The rules governing the appropriateness and extent of the jurisdiction of the
various Indian2 tribal courts that exist concurrently with the court systems of the
states and the federal government are not very well-defined. As such, there exists
little guidance for courts faced with mediation awards and these twin assertions of
jurisdiction. A largely judicial creation, tribal court jurisdiction has been deci-
mated by certain Supreme Court decisions and upheld as fundamentally important
in others.
While the modem trend is to provide tribes with a certain amount of latitude
in some areas, the court in First Specialty Insurance Corp. v. Confederated Tribes
of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon was tasked with shoehorning the facts
into the applicable precedent because the various doctrines defining the limits of
tribal jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") have not often been
tested, as they were here. The district court's opinion followed the modem trend
by upholding the Tribe's assertion of its court system's jurisdiction, yet the court
did not establish a precedent that should trouble the notion of a fair system of
arbitration.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon ("the
Tribe"), a federally recognized Indian tribe, sued its investment advisers, Strategic
Wealth Management3 ("SWM") in Multonmah County (Ore on) Circuit Court in
2001 alleging that SWM violated an Oregon securities law in its dealings with
the Tribe.5 However, pursuant to express language of the parties' 1992 agree-
ment, whereby SWM would serve as the Tribe's financial and investment adviser,
any dispute between the parties was to be settled by binding arbitration.6 In 2002,
1. First Specialty Insur. Corp. v. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Comm. of Ore., No. 07-
05-KI, 2007 WL 3283699 (D. Or. Nov. 2, 2007) [hereinafter FSIC].
2. No pejorative meaning is to be inferred by the use of the term "Indian." The term will be used,
albeit infrequently, throughout this note because that word is most often used by the authorities cited
herein to describe people indigenous to North America.
3. Patrick Sizemore, the president and chief executive officer of SWM, was also a named defendant
in the suit but he has been omitted from the discussion here for the sake of brevity.
4. The statute in question was OR. REv. STAT. § 59.115 (2003). Any discussion of the merits of
SWM's claim, however, is beyond the scope of the question presented in this note.
5. FSIC, 2007 WL 3283699, at *1.
6. Id.
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the circuit court ruled that the binding arbitration language was controlling and
dismissed the claims without prejudice.
In 2003, the Tribe filed a demand for arbitration, seeking damages for misre-
presentations and omissions made by SWM and also alleging securities violations,
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligent misrepresenta-
tion.s SWM counterclaimed against the Tribe, and each party included a request
for attorney's fees in its request for relief.9 A panel from the American Arbitra-
tion Association ("AAA") conducted the arbitration proceedings in 2004.10 The
panel dismissed the Tribe's claim, as well as SWM's counterclaim, and it awarded
SWM more than $1.4 million in attorney fees.1'
Later that year, the Tribe petitioned its own tribal court 12 for an order vacating
the portion of the panel's order that awarded the attorney fees. 13 SWM moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction; the tribal court denied
the motion and, after a hearing on the merits in 2005, granted the Tribe's petition
to vacate attorney fees and Costs. 14 As to the question of jurisdiction, the tribal
court concluded that "SWM ... had significant and long term consensual relation-
ships with the Tribe of the qualifying kind to support Tribal Court jurisdiction.' 15
SWM's insurer, First Specialty Insurance Corporation ("FSIC"), then substituted
for SWM in a 2006 appeal to the Tribal Court of Appeals. 16 The Tribal Court of
Appeals affirmed the original tribal court's order.
17
FSIC then filed the action at hand, this time in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon.' 8 FSIC's main point on appeal was that the tribal court lacked
the subject matter jurisdiction necessary to review an arbitration award under the
FAA.'9 Essentially, FSIC contended that the tribal court's decision to vacate the
arbitration panel's decision concerned not the actions of SWM in its dealings with
the Tribe, but the actions of the arbitration panel, which was located off tribal
lands and thus outside the reach of its court system. The Tribe, which moved for
summary judgment, responded by arguing that SWM's consensual dealings on the
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The district court does not give any details about SWM's counterclaim. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The court also omits all discussion as to why SWM won the award of attorney fees. Id.
12. The history of and current rules regarding tribal jurisdiction will be discussed in greater detail
later in this note. See generally Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Non-
members in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1050 (2005).
13. FSIC, 2007 WL 3283699, at *2. The opinion briefly summarizes the structure of the tribal court.
The tribe's constitution was approved by the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs and
authorizes the establishment of this court. Id. at *1. The Chief Judge and judges for the Court of Ap-
peals must have a J.D. or LL.B degree from an American Bar Association accredited law school, be
members of the Oregon Bar, have at least ten years experience in practice and be able to demonstrate a
knowledge of Indian law, as well as state and federal. Id.
14. Id. at *2.
15. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
16. Id. at *2.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at *3. FSIC also alleged a second error in its appeal, that the arbitration award should be
entered under the FAA. Id. at *5. That point was rendered moot by the court's answer to the jurisdic-
tional question. Id.
20. Id. at *2-*3.
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Tribe's reservation created a clear nexus between the arbitration award and the
original agreement, thus establishing jurisdiction. 21 Once jurisdiction is estab-
lished, the Tribe further argued, federal law requires deference to a ruling of the
tribal court.22 The district court concluded that a consensual relationship existed
between SWM and the Tribe through the parties' contract, providing the tribal
court with a justifiable means by which to assert jurisdiction.23
The district court also had to determine whether "comity"--or defe-
rence-should be extended to the tribal court's rulings.24 In concluding that the
tribal court's rulings "do not conflict" with the ruling of the Oregon state circuit
court, the district court found no reason to withhold comity from the tribal court's
vacatur order.2
5
Because SWM's consensual relationship with the Tribe made the investment
advisers physically enter the reservation on many occasions, the tribal court's
assertion of jurisdiction was valid, and because the tribal court's vacating of the
arbitration panel's award did not conflict with any final judgment entered by a
U.S. court, the Tribe's motion for summary judgment was granted.26
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This case, while factually and procedurally complex, can be broken down
simply into distinct jurisprudential areas. The first is the issue of jurisdiction, both
in terms of venue (regarding the tribal court's ability to overturn the arbitration
panel's decision) and subject matter jurisdiction (regarding the tribal court's abili-
ty to bind its non-Indian adversaries). 27 The second issue deals with comity, as in
whether or not the district court-in applying United States law-must defer to
the ruling of the tribal court.28 The district court followed this general roadmap in
discussing the legal issues in this dispute.
A. Selection of the Appropriate Venue in Which to Challenge
Arbitration Awards
The FAA 29 exists to make written arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable., 30 This portion of the FAA-which has been called its "center-
21. Id. at *2.
22. Id.
23. Id. at *4.
24. Id. Comity is defined as the "practice among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of
different jurisdictions), involving [especially] mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial
acts." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). In this context, comity is recognition of the laws and
customs of the tribal court within the U.S. federal court system and respect for its decisions.
25. FSIC, 2007 WL 3283699, at *5.
26. Id. at *2-*5. The court also mentioned that FSIC wanted a ruling on the merits of the trial court's
opinion, arguing that the tribal court failed to apply federal arbitration standards appropriately. Id. at
*5. However, the district court stated that "disagreement with the Tribal Court's ruling is not a valid
reason for denying comity .... Once [I] decide that the Tribal Court had jurisdiction and that its ruling
was entitled to comity, my role in the dispute is over." Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *4.
29. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
30. Id. at § 2.
3
Terry: Terry: What's Fair Is Fair
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
piece" by the Supreme Court3 '-reflected Congress' main goal in passing the
legislation, which was "abrogat[ing] the general common law rule against specific
enforcement of arbitration agreements ' ' 2 and ensuring that "private arbitration
agreements are enforced according to their terms."
33
To those ends, the FAA provides for a general grant of jurisdiction to the fed-
eral court system in cases where a party refuses to arbitrate, 34 allows a district
court to vacate an award,35 and, most on point for the purposes of the case at hand,
allows a district court to enter judgment on the award itself.36 The FAA also spe-
cifies the particular actions which would allow for an appeal of the decisions of
arbitrators or arbitration panels. 37 Telling, however, is the FAA's permissive lan-
guage regarding the jurisdictional and procedural grants. Parties disputing an
arbitration provision in a contract or quibbling over the arbitrator's award need not
hale themselves into federal district court, but, under the general provisions of the
FAA, they may choose to do so. The emphasis here is on federal courts' desig-
nation as courts of general, not exclusive, jurisdiction. Congress has not, by the
language of the FAA, forced parties into a district court for purposes of settling
their post-arbitration disputes.
39
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co., a 2000 Supreme
Court decision, illustrates the consequences of the venue provisions and provides
further guidance on the issue.40 The Court interpreted the FAA's language regard-
ing jurisdiction as permissive regarding the specific venue: parties are permitted to
bring challenges to arbitration awards not merely in the district wherein the origi-
nal award was made but may enter the federal court system in any district where
jurisdiction could conceivably be found.4'
For example, in Cortez Byrd, the Supreme Court held that the parties were not
restricted to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama-which
includes Birmingham, the city in which the two parties arbitrated-but could con-
ceivably file suit in the Southern District of Mississippi, a venue made appropriate
under 28 U.S.C. § 139 1(a)42 because that is where the two parties signed the origi-
nal contract.43 This decision resolved a significant split within the federal Circuit
31. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1408 (2008) (Stevens, J. & Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
32. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984).
33. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478
(1989).
34. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
35. Id. at § 10.
36. Id. at § 13.
37. Id. at § 16.
38. See, e.g., id. at § 9 ("If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application
may be made to the United States court in and for the district within which such award was made.")
(emphasis added). See also id. at § 16 ("An appeal may be taken... ") (emphasis added).
39. Id. at § 9.
40. 529 U.S. 193 (2000).
41. Id. at 195.
42. This federal civil procedure statute governs venue generally and states in pertinent part, "A civil
action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may... be brought only in ...
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred..." 28 U.S.C. § 139 1(a) (2006).
43. Cortez Byrd Chips Inc., 529 U.S. at 198.
[Vol. 2009
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Courts of Appeals and now gives parties the choice to litigate an arbitration deci-
sion in a potentially more convenient forum. 44
B. Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts, Generally
If, as it appears, Cortez Byrd stands for the proposition that a party may bring
suit to challenge an arbitration award in any forum whereupon jurisdiction would
be proper under federal law, the question for the instant case is: "When may a
tribal court exert jurisdiction over non-members of their tribe?" Such a question
has perplexed the judiciary for quite some time, as the United States policy toward
tribal sovereignty has vacillated over the past 200 years.45
Since the 1934 passage of the Indian Reorganization Act,46 both congression-
al and presidential policies have supported tribal self-determination. Federal sta-
tutes delegated certain powers to tribal governments and appropriations to tribal
courts, while executive orders have affirmed that tribes have a govemment-to-
government relationship with the United States, existing as a "third tier"-in addi-
tion to the state and national governments-within our scheme of federalism.
47
Conservatives approve of this general policy of limited tribal autonomy because it
weakens the federal government's control and promotes economic development;
liberals approve of the policy because it supports the rights of an oppressed minor-
ity and because past actions represented social and racial injustice.48
However, the Supreme Court has, since 1978, divested tribal members of
many of the powers they previously enjoyed over non-members. 49 In the seminal
case Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Supreme Court stated that Indians
gave up their power to try non-Indian U.S. citizens because they "submitt[ed] to
the overriding sovereignty of the United States." 50 The Court appealed to funda-
mental principles in stating that subjecting U.S. citizens to tribal authority would
contravene the "great solicitude that its citizens be protected.., from unwarranted
intrusions on their personal liberty. 51 While the decision was roundly and pas-
52sionately criticized, it only extended as far as criminal prosecutions by tribal
44. Monica Beck Glover, Annual Survey of Caselaw: Arbitration, 23 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REv.
1021, 1023 (2001). Also, it is worth noting that the Court's decision in Cortez Byrd applied to Sections
9 through 11 of the FAA, the sections governing confirmation, vacation, and modification of arbitra-
tion awards, but not to Section 4, which applies when a party is attempting to compel arbitration in the
first place. In that case, as the Tenth Circuit noted, where the parties agreed to arbitrate in a particular
forum, only a district court in that forum has authority to compel arbitration under the FAA. Ansari v.
Qwest Comms. Corp., 414 F.3d 1214, 1216 (10th Cir. 2005).
45. Joseph William Singer, Symposium, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on
Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 641, 648-54 (2003).
46. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (2006). The act was intended to repudiate the federal policy in place at the
time in which Congress intended to destroy tribal governments through programs such as "allotment,"
whereby Congress forced various tribes to sell to the U.S. its surplus land, which would then be sold to
non-Indians. Singer, supra note 45, at 649.
47. Singer, supra note 45, at 648.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 648-49.
50. 435 U.S. 191,210 (1978).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Russell Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REv. 609, 610 (1979) ("A close
No. 11
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courts over non-members. 53 Still, in the period between 1980 and 1990, the Su-
preme Court heard a series of cases dealing with the question of what Oliphant
meant in the civil context; sometimes tribal authority and jurisdiction was af-
firmed, but sometimes it was not.
54
Importantly, however, in Montana v. United States, while ruling against a
tribe's assertion of jurisdiction, the Court did concede that a tribe can hale non-
Indians into its court system in certain circumstances: "A tribe may also retain
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee
lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect
on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.",5  This statement should not be interpreted as an ex ansion of tribal court
authority though, because the Court, for various reasons,Sheld that the tribe in
question could not regulate hunting and fishing on its land by non-members.
57
The Court has continued to narrowly interpret tribal sovereignt seemingly
out of concern about the justice dispensed by tribal governments. Decisions
have followed this general pattern, 59 despite a Congressional rebuke that expressly
granted criminal jurisdiction to Indian tribes over all Indians.60 This may have
been a signal to respect tribal sovereignty, but the Supreme Court has not heeded
the signal because it continues to restrict what subject matters and persons tribal
courts may reach.61 Indeed, a 2001 case decided along these lines62 was assailed
by at least one scholar as possessing the "potential to destroy tribal sovereignty as
we have known it.
63
Tribes can still exert significant jurisdiction over non-Indians, despite the re-
strictions that courts have enacted over the past quarter-century. 64 Tribal courts
retain their jurisdiction in several areas, including suits arising on a reservation
examination of the Court's opinion reveals a carelessness with history, logic, precedent, and statutory
construction that is not ordinarily acceptable from so august a tribunal").
53. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
54. Bethany R. Berger, supra note 12, at 1059. The author describes this period as a conflict of two
visions of tribes, "the first, as sovereign entities needing jurisdiction to build and develop, and the
second as traditional groups for whom exercise of jurisdiction over nonmembers or modem businesses
would be both anomalous and unfair." Id.
55. 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
56. The court cited the history of the once-nomadic tribe in question, the lack of tradition within the
legal system for allowing Indian tribes in general to regulate this activity, and the fact that it had ac-
quiesced to state regulation for a number of years as controlling. Id. at 547, 556, 564, 566-67.
57. Id. at 566-67.
58. Berger, supra note 12, at 1063.
59. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 677 (1990) (holding that tribal courts had no criminal
jurisdiction to prosecute Indians from another tribe); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (holding that the tribe could not zone a parcel of land on
the edge of its reservation, close to substantial non-Indian commercial and residential development).
60. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000).
61. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 439 (1997) (holding that there is no jurisdic-
tion over personal injury claim against non-Indian stemming from accident arising on state highway
through reservation); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645,646 (2001) (holding tribe had no
right to tax hotel owned by non-Indian within reservation).
62. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding that tribal court did not have jurisdiction to hear
claim of damages alleging from state official searching Indian's house which was located on tribally
owed land).
63. Singer, supra note 45, at 645.
64. See Berger, supra note 12, at 1050.
[Vol. 2009
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where the defendant is an Indian 65 and actions against a tribe as an entity. 66 The
principle articulated in Montana regarding the appropriateness of tribal jurisdic-
tion when the conduct of non-Indians on Indian land has some "direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe"
has been cited by several Supreme Court decisions and remains valid law.67 Still,
because only limited types of conduct by non-Indians will bring them under that
penumbra of authority, the practical rule appears to be "that tribes do not possess
authority over non-Indians who come within their borders."
68
But as one scholar notes, as Indian tribes become more involved in commer-
cial activity with non-members, Montana may be increasingly relied upon and the
numbers of non-member litigants in tribal courts may rise.69 The increase in busi-
ness relationships between Indians and non-Indians has an effect upon the field of
arbitration, which is almost exclusively commercial in nature. In the absence of
an express provision and a waiver of sovereign immunity, courts have held that a
tribal court could also have jurisdiction over enforcement of arbitration awards. 70
It is also important to note that various federal courts have heard the affirma-
tive defense of tribal sovereign immunity, which can arise when a tribe attempts to
disclaim a contractual arbitration provision. 71 However, there does not appear to
be a reported decision in which a federal court has tried to apply Cortez Bird's
permissive forum selection scheme to a tribal court's assertion of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court, however, has held that entering into an arbitration
agreement is a clear waiver of sovereign immunity, and therefore, a tribe would be
subject to a state court enforcement action.72 The Court reasoned that the arbitra-
tion clause in question would be rendered "meaningless" if it did not also consti-
tute a waiver of sovereign immunity.73 That is, a tribe should not be allowed to
submit itself to arbitration proceedings only to later claim immunity from the arbi-
tration's enforcement.74
C. Applying Comity to Tribal Court Rulings
While the issues of jurisdiction and comity receive separate treatment for the
purposes of this note, clearly they are quite inseparable. What good is a tribal
court's opportunity to adjudicate if the federal judiciary won't respect that deci-
65. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959).
66. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751,756 (1998).
67. See e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 441 (1997); Hicks, 533 U.S. at 371; S.D. v.
Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 695 (1993).
68. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2712 (2008).
69. Berger, supra note 12, at 1067.
70. See, e.g., Val/Del, Inc. v. Super. Ct. in and for Pima County, 703 P.2d 502, 509 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1985).
71. See, e.g., C & L Enters, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411
(2001); VaI-U Const. Co. of S.D. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 146 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 1988).
72. C & L Enters. Inc., 532 U.S. at 423. See also, Oglala Sioux Tribe v. C & W Enters., Inc., 542
F.3d. 224, 231 (8th Cir 2008) [hereinafter Ogala Sioux Tribe] (holding that participation in arbitration
proceedings precluded tribe from asserting sovereign immunity in state court enforcement proceeding).
73. C & L Enters. Inc., 532 U.S. at 422 (quoting Val/Del Inc., 703 P.2d at 509).
74. See, Oglala Sioux Tribe, 542 F.3d at 231. ("If a tribe were allowed to operate under [American
Arbitration Association] rules, and after an adverse decision assert sovereign immunity and then walk
away, it would convert sovereignty from a shield into a sword").
No. 11
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sion? It is, therefore, self-evident that the doctrine of comity is quite significant in
the context of civil litigation.75 It is not only, perhaps, an unfamiliar term, but a
vaguely defined one, as well. "Where comity is concerned, the treatment by Con-
gress is non-existent, and the treatment by the federal judiciary is limited, leaving
the field open for development.,
76
Comity, in this instance, "deals with how much respect a federal court should
accord a tribal court in its initial determination of jurisdiction, even where the
federal court may share jurisdiction." 77 The general rule is that federal courts
"must recognize and enforce tribal court judgments" under this principle but only
if the tribal court had properly asserted jurisdiction in the first place.'8 Once the
tribal court's decision passes this test, the federal court must enforce the judgment
without reconsidering issues decided by the tribal court. 79 And that is, in essence,
the key to comity: a federal court may not re-litigate questions of law already
80answered by a tribal court, once the jurisdictional test is passed.
At least one scholar has argued that this principle demonstrates a federal poli-
cy of advancing tribal self-governance by requiring the litigants to exhaust their
tribal court remedies.81 This principle is grounded in efficiency because, in a
corollary to the argument that more non-Indians will assuredly enter tribal court
systems as Indian tribes continue to make myriad economic pacts with non-
Indians, the "respect of comity as a doctrine will allow tribal courts to build their
own jurisprudence." 82
Federal courts, including the Ninth Circuit in Wilson v. Marchington, have al-
so addressed comity and relied upon equitable grounds to answer the question of
when to deny comity.8 3 The court in Wilson enumerated four circumstances in
which a court may do so:
(1) the judgment was obtained by fraud; (2) the judgment conflicts with
another final judgment that is entitled to recognition; (3) the judgment is
inconsistent with the parties' contractual choice of forum; or (4) recogni-
tion of the judgment, or the cause of action upon which it is based, is
against the public policy of the United States or the forum state in which
recognition of the judgment is sought. 84
These equitable grounds do not appear to have been widely cited with respect
to the judgments of Indian tribal courts, however, and the Supreme Court has not
75. Raymond L. Niblock & William C. Plouffe, Federal Courts, Tribal Courts, and Comity: Devel-
oping Tribal Judiciaries and Forum Selection, 19 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 219, 220 (1997).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 221.
78. AT&T Corp. v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 295 F.3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). The other generally
accepted reason for denying comity is a lack of due process. Id.
79. Id. at 903-04.
80. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 ("proper deference to the tribal court system
precludes relitigation of issues raised ... and resolved in the Tribal Courts").
81. Niblock & Plouffe, supra note 75, at 231.
82. Id. at 232. (quoting Frank Pommersheim & Shermann Marshall, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard-
work: An Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 411 (1992)).
83. 127 F.3d 805,810 (9th Cir. 1997).
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yet addressed the issue. 85 Thus, the district court in FSIC was forced to balance
the widely permissive venue statutes of the FAA with the generally restrictive
grants of tribal court jurisdiction, all while considering the wide latitude the doc-
trine of comity grants to tribal decisions.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In FSIC, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon alternately dis-
cussed both the venue and comity issues before holding that the tribal court did
indeed have jurisdiction and that its decision was deserving of comity.86
Addressing venue, the district court cited to Cortez Byrd but did not elabo-
rate. 87 It noted the generally permissive nature of the FAA's sections pertaining to
venue and summarily stated that there was "no reason to exclude tribal courts
from the ... conclusion of this analysis."
88
Turning next to the jurisdictional issue, the district court mainly relied upon
Montana89 and Strate v. A-1 Contractors to find that "[b]ut for the . . .
[a]greement [between the tribe and SWM], there would have been no dispute and
no arbitration." 91 Hence, because that contract required SWM to deal with the
Tribe on its reservation hundreds of times, the court concluded that there was a
consensual relationship with the Tribe through this contract that touched squarely
upon the Tribe's economic security, providing the tribal court with a justifiable
means by which to assert jurisdiction.9
As to the issue of comity, FSIC argued primarily on equitable grounds; it
leaned upon the second clause of the test articulated by Wilson,93 asserting that the
"judgment [of the tribal court] conflicts with another final judgment that is entitled
to recognition."94 FSIC claimed that the original Oregon district court ruling that
sent "all claims" to arbitration created the conflict.95 Based on this "all claims"
language, FSIC asserted that the Oregon state court took away the Tribe's sove-
reign immunity-i.e., its basis for possessing a court system in the first place,
without which there obviously could be no jurisdiction-and anZ further judicial
hearing over the matter lay in conflict with the order to arbitrate. 
9
The federal district court, however, refused to "read an implied holding into
the [state] court's ruling. 97 In concluding that the tribal court's rulings "do not
conflict" with the ruling of the Oregon state court, the district court found no rea-
85. See, e.g., John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999); Santa Ynez Band of Mission Indians v.
Torres, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
86. No. 07-05-KI, 2007 WL 3283699, at *4-*5 (D. Or. Nov. 2, 2007).
87. Id. at *3.
88. Id.
89. Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
90. Id. (discussing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)). The district court here explained
that Strate extended the doctrine of limited jurisdiction espoused by Montana to account for assertions
of jurisdiction over non-Indian-owned land within a reservation. FSIC, 2007 WL 3283699, at *3.
91. FSIC, 2007 WL 3283699, at *4.
92. Id.
93. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997).
94. FSIC, 2007 WL 3283699, at *4 (quoting Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810)
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *5.
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son to withhold comity from the tribal court's ruling to vacate the decision of the
arbitration panel.98 The issues thus decided, the court granted the Tribe's motion
for summary judgment and dismissed the action with prejudice. 99
V. COMMENT
It may seem contradictory that the judiciary, on one hand, is engaged in a pat-
tern of limiting tribal court jurisdiction, while on the other hand, is taking steps to
preserve the integrity of that jurisdiction. 1°° This tension is, however, unavoida-
ble. The patchwork of rights and powers granted to and taken away from tribal
courts generally are judicial creations, and because of that-because these rights
and powers are not exclusively reliant upon powers positively granted by Con-
gress-they are not even readily identifiable.' Existing in this sliver of adjudica-
tive space as they do, decisions regarding tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction are
few; yet it is these relatively few cases driving the body of law forward. 1°w
This lack of guideposts conflicts directly with the legislative and executive
policy, shown above, of advancing the tribal judiciary. The federal judiciary,
while ostensibly ensuring, though its limitations on tribal jurisdiction, that U.S.
citizens are adequately protected from overreaching tribal judiciaries, has general-
ly recognized that permitting tribes a certain degree of autonomy over their own
affairs is for the tribes' own benefit. 10 3 In that context, the argument that "a criti-
cal part of promoting tribal self-government is advancing a tribal judiciary"''1 4
makes the utmost sense. If the United States is going to allow the various tribal
courts a certain degree of autonomy, such a policy needs teeth, or it risks becom-
ing ineffectual. Limiting tribal courts' reach further risks jeopardizing the incen-
tive for tribal judges to do an adequate job because a lack of any and all jurisdic-
tion denies these courts any sense of self-importance, which could discourage
judges from taking their roles seriously--the effect being perhaps an erosion of
any sense of fairness.
0 5
With that general background, it is a bit easier to find FSIC's place within the
historical and policy-driven framework of tribal adjudication. While the language
of the opinion and the holding itself are not particularly revolutionary, or even
plainly noteworthy, it would understate the case's relevance to the body of law
governing tribal courts by stating that FSIC merely stands for the proposition that
the FAA allows for tribal court review of arbitration decisions.
For instance, the district court's comment that it "s[aw] no reason to exclude
tribal courts from the permissive conclusion" of the Cortez Byrd venue selection
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). The opinion
here placed great emphasis on the policy of promoting self government, citing to a Congressional
policy in favor of Indian self-governance and several practical, procedural reasons in support. Id. at
856-57.
101. Niblock & Plouffe, supra note 75, at 225.
102. Id. at 226.
103. Id. at 226-27.
104. Id. at 227.
105. Berger, supra note 12, at 1052.
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analysis °6 contrasts sharply with the language used in Supreme Court cases like
Oliphant, in which the Court took a patronizing view of the ability of tribal courts
to fairly exercise any jurisdiction over outsiders. 1° 7  Whereas the Court once
doubted that tribal courts could ever be fair, the district court in FSIC assumed
just the opposite: that there was no reason to deny a tribal court the opportunity to
hear a challenge to an arbitration proceeding entered into under United States, not
tribal, law. This is not to suggest that FSIC is a revolutionary decision, that the
court here has crafted a novel interpretation of tribal sovereignty; it does, howev-
er, reflect the trend in moderm jurisprudence of elevating the issue of tribal juris-
diction to a "principle of law." 10
8
Of course, this decision lends itself to a certain level of skepticism as to the
possibility that a tribal court can simply take an arbitration decision it does not
like and use a permissive doctrine to challenge the decision in its own court sys-
tem. Having shown that, arguably, Cortez Byrd does allow a tribe to use the FAA
to bring a decision it dislikes into the tribal courts, the underlying question is,
should a tribe be allowed to? Is it fair to allow a tribe to forum shop to the extent
that the Tribe did in FSIC, theoretically gaining a sizable advantage over cultural
outsiders?
In answering that question, it is important to look back to the locus of the dis-
pute in this instance. The district court found that SWM, FSIC' s litigative succes-
sor-in-interest, met with the Tribe hundreds of times on the Tribe's reservation
throughout the parties' contractual history. °9 It is not unreasonable to demand
that SWM be cognizant of the possibility it may be haled into tribal court by na-
ture of its relationship. Given the broad latitude over venue selection granted by
both the FAA and Cortez Byrd, the decision to allow the Tribe to assert its juris-
diction over the matter is not, on its face, an unreasonable one. In this sense,
"fairness" has the same meaning one might ascribe to it in a more general debate
over black-letter rules governing personal jurisdiction.
In fact, one scholar argues that the tribal court's FSIC ruling is a "perfect ex-
ample" of fairness.' 1 That author asserts that SWM presented itself as being able
to "bridge the gap" between the Tribe's on-reservation capital and off-reservation
opportunities to invest that capital; SWM should have expected to be haled into
tribal court in the event of a dispute.11 '
But to be sure, when speaking of "fairness," the fairness in question has the
cultural undertones espoused by the Supreme Court in Oliphant. To be "fair," in
this context, means to be blind to the acrimony that pervades this nation's histori-
cally sordid relationship with the various indigenous peoples that pre-existed co-
lonization. So, is this decision the clarion call giving rise to the idea that no arbi-
tration decision disagreeable to an Indian tribe will ever be honored because it is
106. FSIC, No. 07-05-KI, 2007 WL 3283699, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 2, 2007).
107. Berger, supra note 12, at 1055-56. The language of the Oliphant Court, which stated that tribal
jurisdiction must be denied in criminal cases because of the importance of "[U.S.] citizens being pro-
tected... from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty," implies that the Court did not be-
lieve tribal courts would adequately handle such matters. Id. at 1050.
108. Niblock & Plouffe, supra note 75, at 236.
109. FSIC, 2007 WL 3283699, at *4.
110. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Toward a Theory of Intertribal and Intratribal Common Law, 43 Hous.
L. REv. 701, 723 (2006).
111. Id.
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sure to be thrown out by a more favorable court system? In this context, the ques-
tion is better framed as: "Can fairness even exist here?"
Simply put, yes, for several reasons. One scholar has shown through exhaus-
tive evidence that, historically, tribal courts have been fair to non-members." 2 In
decisions regarding tribes and outsiders, not only does it appear that there is "nu-
merical" balance-i.e., regarding the number of times outsiders win versus how
often they lose-but it also appears that there is "qualitative" balance-i.e., bal-
ance in areas more prone to bias, such as contract disputes." 3 The balance is what
one would normally expect from litigated decisions." 14 Clearly, this "tends to
undermine the assumption that the [tribal] courts are unfair to ... outsiders. ' 15
More specifically, "non-Indian businesses are not overly disadvantaged" in the
Indian courts that formed the basis of the study." 6 They have even been found to
be more pro-business than surrounding U.S. District and Circuit Courts."
t7
Furthermore, this jurisdictional tug-of-war does not exist in a vacuum. It is
counterintuitive that an Indian tribe would usurp its authority by acting in a pa-
tently absurd and unfair way. Tribes have "extremely strong incentives to act
fairly to non-Indians in their dealings."" 8 They must know that the only thing
standing in the way of losing their sovereign powers is Congressional action."
9
To think they would engage in a systematic pattern of unfairness toward non-
members is baseless. 20 Were tribes to continually challenge arbitration awards in
their own court systems, with the express intent that these systems would inevita-
bly render a judgment more favorable to the tribes, certainly Congress' interest
would be piqued, and an elimination of tribal jurisdiction in this arena could be a
mere rubber-stamped act of Congress away. That tribal jurisdiction and sove-
reignty are entirely dependent upon U.S. acquiescence is motivation enough for
tribes to ensure that their systems of justice are inherently fair to outsiders.
It also seems just as appropriate to attack this fundamental question from the
opposite angle: is it not also possible that state and federal courts may be inherent-
ly unfair to tribal members, especially because the Supreme Court and Congress
have, through various acts and decisions, asserted plenary power over tribes?'
21
In other words, because Congress and U.S. courts have as much power over tribes
and tribe members as they care to give themselves, what framework exists to pro-
tect Indian interests when they are only insulated from the outside by a benevolent
federal policy that has provided tribes the limited jurisdiction and sovereignty that
they now enjoy? Perhaps to be "fair" is simply to be respectful of the tribal au-
112. Berger, supra note 12, at 1051-52.
113. Id. Berger found that 47.4 percent of non-members won when they appeared before the Najavo
Nation court system between January 1969 and December 2004, a number that is hardly indicative of a
widespread bias, even when taking account of the fact that Navajo customary or common law is the
law of preference within their courts. Id. at 1075. While the long statistical analysis Berger cites as
evidence will not be dissected in detail here, it is worth mentioning that analyses of other tribal court
systems suggest a similar parity. Id. at 1094-97.
114. Id. at 1076.
115. Id. at 1077.
116. Id. at 1086.
117. Id. at 1087.
118. Singer, supra note 45, at 667.
119, Id.
120. Id. at 667-68.
121. Id. at 665.
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thority that exists contemporaneously with current federal laws because only then
is the United States government acting consistently with the inherent first prin-
ciples of civil rights, property rights, and democracy that guide the nation as a
whole. 122 In that sense, it seems only fair to encourage self-governance in as
many ways as possible.
If there is no reason to believe that tribal courts cannot be fair to outsiders-
and that does appear to be the case-there is little justification for clinging to the
outdated belief that tribal courts lack the inherent ability to adjudicate fairly. Be-
cause there is no reason to believe that tribal courts cannot look at conflicts be-
tween tribal members and non-members dispassionately, there is no reason to
believe that the Tribe's actions in FSIC signal any unfortunate trend in arbitration
between tribes and outsiders. A more objective reading begs for an interpretation
that FSIC stands for no more than an acknowledgement of the appropriateness of
tribal adjudication in certain circumstances and a necessary commitment to the
principle of tribal self-government.
123
VI. CONCLUSION
It is easy to see why such a short decision emanating from the U.S. District
Court for the District of Oregon might elicit the following knee-jerk reaction:
"You mean to tell me that a tribe can simply take an arbitration award it doesn't
like and appeal the decision to its own court?" In First Specialty Insurance Corp.
v. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon, the district
court, in essence, held just that, subject to the caveat that there be sufficient per-
sonal jurisdiction over the non-member party in the first place.
However, this decision should not deter future non-member parties from in-
cluding arbitration provisions when agreeing to contract, nor should it lead to a
fear that such arbitration decisions will be rendered moot by what some might
term a "more favorable" tribal court. As history has shown, tribal courts have
been able to rule with the required impartiality. As notions of justice demand, it is
only appropriate for the judiciary to let tribal courts assert the jurisdictional and
sovereign principles afforded them by Congress. This decision is nothing more
than an affirmation of the importance of treating the tribal court systems, as well
as the members and non-members whose disputes they settle, with the respect
they deserve. After all, it's only fair.
MATrHEw E. TERRY
122. Id.
123. Berger, supra note 12, at 1125.
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